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Abstract
We consider a scenario in which K transmitters attempt to communicate covert messages reliably to
a legitimate receiver over a discrete memoryless multiple-access channel (MAC) while simultaneously
escaping detection from an adversary who observes their communication through another discrete memo-
ryless MAC. We assume that each transmitter may use a secret key that is shared only between itself and
the legitimate receiver. We show that each of the K transmitters can transmit on the order of
√
n reliable
and covert bits per n channel uses, exceeding which, the warden will be able to detect the communication.
We identify the optimal pre-constants of the scaling, which leads to a complete characterization of the
covert capacity region of the K-user binary-input MAC. We show that, asymptotically, all sum-rate
constraints are inactive unlike the traditional MAC capacity region. We also characterize the channel
conditions that have to be satisfied for the transmitters to operate without a secret key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the characterization of the information-theoretic limits of
covert communication. Following the early work [2] identifying the existence of a square-root law similar
to that of steganography [3], [4], several follow-up works have refined the characterization of the square-
root law for point-to-point classical channels [5], [6], [7], [8] and classical-quantum channels [9], [10],
[11]; in particular, the covert capacity has been defined and precisely computed for Discrete Memoryless
Channels (DMCs) and Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels. Other extensions have included
developing an understanding of when the square-root law does not apply, such as in the presence of
channel uncertainty [12], [13], [14], [15], [16] or timing uncertainty [17], [18]. There have also been
Parts of this manuscript were presented at the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory [1]. This work
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2several investigations of multi-user models [19], [20], [21], [22], timing channels [23], [24], artificial-
noise assisted transmissions [25], and covert key generation [26], as well as code designs [27], [28], [29].
Finally, we note that related works have explored the concept of stealth [30], which is tightly tied to
the notion of approximation of output statistics [31], [32] and may be viewed as low probability of
interception, whereas covertness focuses on low probability of detection.
The main result developed in this paper is the characterization of the covert capacity region of the
K-user binary-input MAC. The tools used are natural extensions of the techniques developed for point-
to-point covert and stealth channels in [5], [6], [30] and for MAC resolvability [33], [34], [35], but the
converse proof requires special care beyond the approach used in [6]. We extend our previous work [1] by
analyzing K-user MACs for any K > 2 and characterizing the optimal key throughput required for covert
communication. We show that, asymptotically, there exist no sum-rate constraints unlike the traditional
MAC rate region;1 intuitively, this happens because covertness is such a stringent constraint that the
covert users never transmit enough bits to saturate the capacity of the channel. The system behaves as
if a covert communication budget were merely allocated to the different users.2 A similar behavior was
observed [36, Theorem 6] in the calculation of the channel capacity per unit cost of a two-user MAC
when both users consist of a free input symbol.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set the notation used in the
paper, and in Section III, we formally introduce our channel model and define the covert capacity region.
In Section IV, we develop a preliminary result that captures the essence of our approach to covertness
and extends [6, Lemma 1]. We establish the covert capacity region of the K-user binary-input MAC in
Section V and conclude our work with a brief discussion of extensions and open problems in Section VI.
The proofs of all lemmas are relegated to the appendix.
II. NOTATION
We denote random variables and their realizations in upper and lower case, respectively. All sequences
in boldface are n-length sequences, where n ∈ N∗, unless specified otherwise. We define the weight of
a sequence as the number of non-zero symbols in that sequence. Throughout the paper, log and exp are
understood to the base e; the results can be interpreted in bits by converting log to the base 2. Adhering
to standard information-theoretic notation, H(X) and I(X;Y ) represent the entropy of X and the mutual
information between X and Y , respectively. For x ∈ [0, 1], let Hb (x) denote the binary entropy of x. For
1We correct an embarrassing oversight in the converse argument outlined in [1], in which we assumed that the channels
perceived by the users were independent without formal proof. The corrected argument is now given in Section V-C.
2This intuitive interpretation is attributed to Sidharth Jaggi, during discussions at ISIT 2016.
3two distributions, P and Q, defined on the same finite alphabet X , the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
is D(P‖Q) ,∑x P (x) log P (x)Q(x) and the variational distance is V(P,Q) , 12 ∑x |P (x)−Q(x)|. They are
related by Pinsker’s inequality [37] as V(P,Q)2 6 12D(P‖Q). If P is absolutely continuous with respect
to (w.r.t.) Q, we write P  Q. For x ∈ R, we define [x]+ , max (x, 0). We denote the cardinality of
a set T by |T |, and we represent the vector {Xk : k ∈ T } by X[T ]. We denote the cartesian product
×k∈T Xk by X [T ]. Furthermore, ∅ denotes an empty set, and S \ T denotes the set difference of two
sets S and T .
III. CHANNEL MODEL
We define the set K , J1,KK, where K ∈ N∗ and K > 2. We analyze the channel model illustrated in
Figure 1, in which K transmitters simultaneously communicate with a legitimate receiver over a discrete
memoryless MAC
(X [K],WY |X[K],Y) in the presence of a warden monitoring the communication over
another discrete memoryless MAC
(X [K],WZ|X[K],Z). As both channels are memoryless, we denote
the transition probabilities corresponding to n uses of the channel by W ⊗nY |X[K] ,
∏n
i=1WY |X[K] and
W ⊗nZ|X[K] ,
∏n
i=1WZ|X[K]. In addition, we assume for simplicity of exposition that each user k ∈ K uses
the same binary input alphabet Xk , X , {0, 1} and that the output alphabets Y and Z are finite. We let
0 ∈ X be the innocent symbol corresponding to the channel input when no communication takes place.
We assume that all terminals are synchronized and possess complete knowledge of the coding scheme
used.
The user indexed by k ∈ K, encodes a uniformly-distributed message Wk ∈ J1,MkK and a uniformly-
distributed secret key Sk ∈ J1, LkK, which is shared only with the receiver, into a codeword Xk(Wk, Sk) ∈
X n of length n. We denote the collection of the K codewords {Xk (Wk, Sk)}k∈K by XK (W [K], S[K]).
When the context is clear, we drop the message and key indices, Wk and Sk, and denote Xk(Wk, Sk)
by Xk instead for conciseness. It is convenient to think about the K inputs to the channel over n uses
as a matrix X [K] of size K × n obtained by vertically stacking the K codewords, each of which is a
row vector. The inputs corresponding to all users indexed by the elements of a non-empty set U ⊂ K
is a sub-matrix of X [K] obtained by selecting the rows whose indices belong to U and is denoted by
X [U ]. The K users then transmit codewords X [K] over the channel in n channel uses. At the end of
transmission, the receiver observes Y while the warden observes Z, both of which are of length n.
We introduce a K-length row vector XU = (X1, X2, . . . , XK), U ⊆ K, with entry Xk = 1 if k ∈ U
and Xk = 0 otherwise. With our assumption that all channel inputs are binary, we represent every
column of the matrix X [K] by a vector (XU )T , where the set U consists of the indices of all users
transmitting symbol 1 in this column. We denote the kth component of XU by XU ,k. In accordance with
4the notation introduced in the previous paragraph, XU [T ] represents a row vector of length |T | that
contains the entries {XU ,k}k∈T . Note the difference between X [U ] and XU ; the former is a |U|-length
vector {Xk}k∈U whereas the latter is a K-length vector with 1’s in indices that belong to the set U . For
conciseness, we define
PU (y) ,WY |X[K](y|xU ), QU (z) ,WZ|X[K](z|xU ), (1)
which represent the one-shot output distributions at the legitimate receiver and the warden, respectively,
when only the transmitters in U ⊆ K transmit symbol 1, while the transmitters in Uc transmit a 0. When
U is a singleton set {k}, which corresponds to user k transmitting 1 and all other users transmitting
0, we write Pk and Qk instead of P{k} and Q{k}, respectively. If U = ∅, which occurs when all
users transmit the innocent symbol 0, we write P∅ and Q∅. We assume that QU  Q∅ for all non-
empty sets U ⊆ K and that Q∅ cannot be written as a convex combination of the form Q∅(z) =∑
T ⊆K
(∏
k∈T µk
) (∏
k∈T c(1− µk)
)
QT (z) for some {µk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K \ {0}k∈K. In the former case,
covert communication involving all K users is impossible; in the latter case, covert communication would
directly follow from known channel resolvability results [33], [34], [35] and would be possible at a non
zero-rate. We also assume that there does not exist {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K with
∑
k∈K ρk = 1 such that∑
k∈K ρkQk(z) = Q∅(z) for all z ∈ Z . As we shall see later in Section IV, the square root law of covert
communication can be circumvented if such a {ρk}k∈K exists.
Upon observing Y, the legitimate receiver estimates the message vector Ŵ [K]. We measure reliability
at the receiver with the average probability of error Pne , P
(
Ŵ [K] 6= W [K]
)
. Upon observing Z, the
warden attempts to detect whether all K users transmitted covert messages (Hypothesis H1) or not
(Hypothesis H0) by performing a hypothesis test on Z. We denote the Type I (rejecting H0 when true)
USER 1
USER 2
USER K
...
W1
W2
WK
SK
S2
S1
ENC
ENC
ENC
DEC
DET
RECEIVER
WARDEN
X1
X2
XK
Y
Z
S[K]
W  nY|X[K]
W  nZ|X[K]
H0 : Q  n 
H1 :  Qn
 W[K]
Fig. 1. Model of covert communication over a MAC with K transmitters.
5and Type II (accepting H0 when false) error probabilities by α and β, respectively. The warden can
achieve any pair (α, β) such that α + β = 1 by ignoring his observation Z and basing his decision on
the result of a coin toss. We define the distribution induced at the warden when communication takes
place by
Q̂n(z) , 1∏
k∈KMkLk
∑
m[K]
∑
`[K]
W ⊗nZ|X[K] (z|xK (m[K], `[K])) . (2)
We measure covertness in terms of the KL divergence D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
, where Q⊗n∅ is the distribution observed
by the warden when none of the K users transmits any covert information. We know from [38] that any
test conducted by the warden on Z satisfies α + β > 1− V(Q̂n, Q⊗n∅ ). Using Pinsker’s inequality [37],
we write α + β > 1 −
√
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
. The primary objective of our covert communication scheme is
to guarantee that D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
is negligible so that any statistical test used by the warden on Z is futile.
Note that we only consider communication schemes for which logMk grows to infinity, for k ∈ K, as n
grows to infinity.
Definition 1. The tuple r[K] ∈ RK+ is an achievable reliable and covert throughput tuple if there exists
a sequence of codes as defined above with increasing blocklength n such that for every k ∈ K,
lim inf
n→∞
logMk√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
) > rk, (3)
and
lim
n→∞P
n
e = 0, limn→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
= 0. (4)
The covert capacity region of the K-user MAC consists of the closure of the set of all achievable
throughput tuples r[K]. Also, we define the tuple s[K] ∈ RK+ as an achievable key throughput tuple
associated with the achievable reliable and covert throughput tuple r[K], if there exist a sequence of
codes satisfying (3) and (4) and if for all k ∈ K,
sk > lim sup
n→∞
logLk√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
) . (5)
Note that in (3), we normalize the number of bits logMk by
√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
instead of n as
traditionally done in information-theoretic problems. The normalization by
√
n is essential to reflect
the fact that covert communication corresponds to a zero-rate regime, in which the number of bits scales
sub-linearly with the number of channel uses. The normalization by
√
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
is also crucial to
reflect the fact that D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
influences {logMk}k∈K. While the normalization might seem somewhat
ad-hoc, it is justified a posteriori in Section V when we prove that logMk/
√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
is independent
6of n in the limit of large blocklength. Said differently, logMk/
√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
plays the role of the
usual “rate” in that it asymptotically does not depend on the blocklength n and already integrates the
scaling. To avoid confusion, we refer to rk as throughput instead of rate.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
Following the approach proposed in [6], we introduce a covert communication process, which is an
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) process indistinguishable from the innocent distribution Q⊗n∅
in the limit. The rationale for introducing this process is to precisely quantify the fraction of channel
uses in which the users can transmit symbol 1 while simultaneously avoiding detection by the warden,
without introducing the coding aspect of the problem yet.
For n ∈ N∗, let αn ∈ (0, 1). Let ρ , {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K such that3
∑
k∈K ρk = 1. We define the input
distributions {ΠXk}k∈K on X as
ΠXk(1) = 1−ΠXk(0) = ρkαn. (6)
The output distributions at the legitimate receiver and the warden when the input distribution of each
user k is ΠXk are defined, respectively, as
Pαn(y) ,
∑
x[K]
WY |X[K](y|x[K])
(∏
k∈K
ΠXk(xk)
)
, (7)
Qαn(z) ,
∑
x[K]
WZ|X[K](z|x[K])
(∏
k∈K
ΠXk(xk)
)
. (8)
The n-fold product distributions corresponding to (6), (7), and (8) are
Π⊗nXk =
n∏
j=1
ΠXk , P
⊗n
αn =
n∏
j=1
Pαn , Q
⊗n
αn =
n∏
j=1
Qαn . (9)
For a set T ⊆ K, we define
GT (z) ,
∑
U⊆T
(−1)|T |−|U|QU (z). (10)
Then, using Lemma 5 in Appendix A, we write
Qαn(z) = Q∅(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:T 6=∅
(∏
k∈T
ρkαn
)
GT (z). (11)
3The assumption
∑
k ρk = 1 is only made for convenience and, as we shall see from the converse part of Theorem 1, without
loss of generality.
7Note that since QT  Q∅ for all non-empty sets T ⊆ K, it is also true that Qαn  Q∅. Furthermore,
we define
ζn(z) ,
Qαn(z)−Q∅(z)
αn
, χn(ρ) ,
∑
z
ζ2n(z)
Q∅(z)
, (12)
ζ(z) ,
∑
k∈K
ρk(Qk(z)−Q∅(z)), χ(ρ) ,
∑
z
ζ2(z)
Q∅(z)
. (13)
In the following lemma, we bound the KL divergence between Qαn and Q∅. Later, we use the results of
this lemma to show that for specific choices of αn, the stochastic process Q⊗nαn is indistinguishable from
the innocent distribution Q⊗n∅ in the limit.
Lemma 1. Let the sequence {αn}n>1 be such that limn→∞ αn = 0. Then, for n ∈ N∗ large enough,
α2n
2
(1 +
√
αn)χn(ρ) > D(Qαn‖Q∅) >
α2n
2
(1−√αn)χn(ρ). (14)
In addition, for all z ∈ Z , limn→∞ ζn(z) = ζ(z) and limn→∞ χn(ρ) = χ(ρ). Finally, for random vari-
ables (X[T ], Z) ∈ X |T |×Z for some non-empty set T ⊆ K with joint distribution WZ|X[T ]
(∏
k∈T ΠXk
)
,
we have
I(X[T ];Z) =
∑
k∈T
ρkαnD(Qk‖Q∅) +O
(
α2n
)
. (15)
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix B. Assume that each transmitter k ∈ K generates a
sequence of length n using the process Π⊗nXk . The weight of these sequences is ρknαn on average. To be
indistinguishable from the innocent distribution in the limit, the covert process Q⊗nαn has to satisfy
lim
n→∞D
(
Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n∅
)
= lim
n→∞nD(Qαn‖Q∅) = 0. (16)
Our assumptions in Section III ensure that χ (ρ) is non-zero. Consequently, from the results of Lemma 1
and (16), we conclude that if we choose the sequence {αn}n∈N∗ such that limn→∞ nα2n = 0, our covert
process Q⊗nαn is indistinguishable from Q
⊗n
∅ in the limit. Consequently, we will construct a coding scheme
that emulates the covert process Q⊗nαn instead of Q
⊗n
∅ . The prime benefit of using Q
⊗n
αn instead of Q
⊗n
∅ is
that Q⊗nαn allows us to convey covert information through the use of 1 symbols. In particular, it is possible
to choose {αn}n∈N∗ such that limn→∞ nαn =∞ so that the number of information bits grows with n.
The “square root law” of covert communication follows from the constraint limn→∞ nα2n = 0, which
forces the scaling of nαn to be arbitrarily close to but not exceed
√
n. If χ(ρ) = 0 for some ρ, one
would need to push the approximation of D
(
Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n∅
)
at least to the order α3n in Lemma 1. In turn,
we would only need to choose a sequence such that limn→∞ nα3n = 0, effectively allowing the increase
of the scaling of nαn to be arbitrarily close to but not exceed n2/3 and beating the square root law. The
8assumption that χ(ρ) > 0 made in Section III therefore excludes the (rare) situations in which the square
root law can be beaten.
V. MAIN RESULT
We characterize the covert capacity region of a K-user binary-input MAC in Theorem 1, with the
achievability proof in Section V-B and the converse proof in Section V-C. The proofs adapt channel
resolvability and converse techniques used in [6] for point-to-point channels to the MACs. The achiev-
ability proof is an extension of [6], and we provide details in the appendix; the converse proof presents
more challenges and is fully detailed.
A. Covert capacity region of the K-user binary-input MAC
Theorem 1. For ρ , {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K such that
∑
k∈K ρk = 1, define
χ(ρ) ,
∑
z
(∑
k∈K ρk (Qk(z)−Q∅(z))
)2
Q∅(z)
. (17)
For the K-user binary-input MAC described in Section III, the covert capacity region is⋃
{ρk}k∈K∈[0,1]K :∑k∈K ρk=1
{
{rk}k∈K : ∀k ∈ K, rk 6
√
2
χ (ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅)
}
. (18)
In addition, for any achievable reliable and covert throughput tuple r[K] on the boundary of the covert
capacity region characterized by ρ, the set of achievable key throughput tuples is{
{sk}k∈K : ∀k ∈ K, sk >
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρk [D(Qk‖Q∅)− D(Pk‖P∅)]+
}
. (19)
Note that χ (ρ) in (17) is positive under the assumption made in Section III, so that the bounds in (18)
and (19) are well defined and finite. A few remarks are now in order.
• Our characterization of the covert capacity region only involves constraints on individual user’s
throughputs; there are no active constraints on the sum throughput. However, the individual through-
puts are not identical to those of the single-user case [6], as there exists a non-trivial interplay among
the ρk’s, for k ∈ K, through χ(ρ) in (18).
• User k ∈ K can achieve its maximum covert and reliable throughput without a key only if
D(Pk‖P∅) > D(Qk‖Q∅), (20)
is satisfied; that is, no secret key is required for user k if the channel from user k to the receiver is
better than the channel to the warden when all other users are silent.
9• If the MAC is symmetric, in the sense that ∀z ∈ Z and ∀k ∈ K, Qk(z) = Q(z), then
∑
k∈K ρk
(Qk(z)−Q∅(z)) = Q(z)−Q∅(z), so that χ(ρ) is independent of ρ and time sharing is optimal.
Figure 2 illustrates the covert capacity region for a 2-user MAC with randomly generated channel
matrices, WY |X1X2 and WZ|X1X2 , that satisfy (20) for k ∈ {1, 2} and the absolute continuity requirements
described in Section III for K = {1, 2}. The thick solid curve denotes the boundary of the covert capacity
region. All points on this boundary can be achieved by varying the values of (ρ1, ρ2). For ρ = ρ∗ ,
(ρ∗1, ρ∗2), the achievable covert throughput region is highlighted in Figure 2, where the square marker
represents the maximum achievable covert throughput pair
(√
2
χ(ρ∗)ρ
∗
1D(P1‖P∅),
√
2
χ(ρ∗)ρ
∗
2D(P2‖P∅)
)
,
while the triangular marker represents the pair
(√
2
χ(ρ∗)ρ
∗
1D(Q1‖Q∅),
√
2
χ(ρ∗)ρ
∗
2D(Q2‖Q∅)
)
. A non-
empty intersection of the region to the top-right of the triangular marker and the region to the bottom-left
of the square marker implies the existence of keyless covert communication schemes. If the regions do
not intersect, a secret key is required to communicate covertly. Note that the achievable region is still
the region spanning from (0,0) to the square marker as highlighted in Figure 2. Also note that, for a
symmetric 2-user MAC, the boundary of the covert capacity region is a straight line, and time sharing
is optimal.
0.2
0
0
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.2
1.0
1.4
1.00.5 1.5
r1
r2
Boundary of covert capacity region
Reliability constraint for (ρ 1 , ρ 2)
Covert constraint for (ρ 1 , ρ 2)
Achievable throughput region for (ρ 1 , ρ 2)
Fig. 2. Representative example of the covert capacity region for a 2-user MAC. The achievable rate region for a specific choice
of ρ = ρ∗ = (ρ∗1, ρ∗2) is highlighted.
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B. Achievability proof
We consider a communication scheme in which every user k employs Lk sub-codebooks, each con-
sisting of Mk codewords. The value of the key Sk ∈ J1, LkK chooses the sub-codebook that user k uses
to encode its message Wk ∈ J1,MkK. The decoder, which possesses complete knowledge of the keys
S[K], attempts to decode the messages sent by the K transmitters. The idea underlying the scheme is
to use channel resolvability techniques to ensure that the total number of codewords is sufficiently large
to keep the warden confused, while simultaneously ensuring that each sub-codebook is small enough for
the receiver to reliably decode the messages.
Proposition 1. Let ρ , {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K with
∑
k∈K ρk = 1. Let {αn}n∈N∗ be such that αn ∈ (0, 1),
limn→∞ nαn = ∞, and limn→∞ nα2n = 0. For the channel model described in Section III, for an
arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1), there exist covert communication schemes such that ∀k ∈ K,
rk = (1− µ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅), (21)
sk =
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρk [(1 + µ)D(Qk‖Q∅)− (1− µ)D(Pk‖P∅)]+ , (22)
lim
n→∞P
n
e = 0, (23)
lim
n→∞D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
= 0. (24)
Proof. To prove Proposition 1, we rely on random coding arguments for channel reliability and channel
resolvability. However, the use of low-weight codewords in our communication scheme requires that we
handle concentration inequalities carefully. Since basic concentration inequalities do not apply in the
low-weight regime [6], we use Bernstein’s inequality to establish our random coding arguments. The
proof follows otherwise along the lines of [6, Theorem 2].
a) Random codebook generation: At each transmitter k ∈ K, generate MkLk codewords xk (mk, `k)
∈ X n, where (mk, `k) ∈ J1,MkK× J1, LkK, independently at random according to the distribution Π⊗nXk .
For a set T ⊂ K, define
W ⊗nY |X[T ] (y|x[T ]) ,
∑
x[T c]
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|x[K])
(∏
k∈T c
Π⊗nXk (xk)
)
. (25)
Note that W ⊗nY |X[T ] is a product distribution since each user k ∈ K generates its codeword according
to an n-fold product distribution Π⊗nXk . Also, note that if T = ∅, W ⊗nY |X[T ] = P ⊗nαn . Define the set
11
Anγ ,
⋂
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
AnγT with
AnγT ,
{
(x[K], y) ∈ X n[K]× Yn : log
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|x[K])
W ⊗nY |X[T c] (y|x[T c])
> γT
}
, (26)
where, for every non-empty set T ⊆ K, γT , (1− µ)nI(X[T ];Y |X[T c]) for an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1).
Encoder k ∈ K uses the key Sk = `k to map the message Wk = mk onto the codeword xk (mk, `k). The
codewords are then transmitted through the memoryless MAC to the legitimate receiver. The decoder,
who observes y and has complete knowledge of the keys `[K], operates as follows.
• If there exists a unique m[K] ∈ ×Kk=1J1,MkK such that (xK (m[K], `[K]) , y) ∈ Anγ , output Ŵ [K] =
m[K],
• Else, declare a decoding error.
b) Channel reliability analysis: The decoding error probability Pne averaged over all random code-
books satisfies the following.
Lemma 2. For any µ ∈ (0, 1), an n large enough, and
logMk = (1− µ) ρknαnD(Pk‖P∅), (27)
for every k ∈ K, the probability of decoding error averaged over all random codebooks satisfies
E(Pne ) 6 exp (−ξnαn) , (28)
for an appropriate ξ > 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix D.
c) Channel resolvability analysis: In the following lemma, we show that the KL divergence between
the induced distribution and the covert stochastic process averaged over all random codebooks vanishes
in the limit.
Lemma 3. For any µ ∈ (0, 1), an n large enough, and
logMkLk = (1 + µ) ρknαnD(Qk‖Q∅), (29)
for every k ∈ K, the KL divergence between Q̂n and Q⊗nαn averaged over all random codebooks satisfies
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6 exp (−ξnαn) , (30)
for an appropriate ξ > 0.
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix E.
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d) Identification of a specific code: Using Markov’s inequality, we obtain
P
(
Pne < 4E(Pne ) ∩ D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
< 4E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)))
> 1
2
. (31)
Then, we conclude that there must exist at least one coding scheme such that for appropriate constants
ξ1, ξ2 > 0 and an n large enough, we have
Pne 6 exp (−ξ1nαn) , (32)
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
6 exp (−ξ2nαn) . (33)
Lemma 4. For n large enough and an appropriate constant ξ3 > 0,∣∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅ )− D(Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n∅ )∣∣∣ 6 exp (−ξ3nαn) , (34)
provided D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
satisfies (33).
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix F. Using (14), (32), (34), and our choice of {αn}n∈N∗ ,
we conclude that there exists at least one coding scheme that satisfies (23) and (24). Combining (14)
and (34) yields
nα2n
2
(1 +
√
αn)χn(ρ) + exp (−ξ3nαn) > D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
> nα
2
n
2
(1−√αn)χn(ρ)− exp (−ξ3nαn) . (35)
We normalize logMk, where k ∈ K, by
√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
using (27), (29), and (35) to obtain
lim
n→∞
logMk√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
) = (1− µ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅), (36)
lim
n→∞
logMkLk√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
) = (1 + µ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Qk‖Q∅). (37)
Combining (36) and (37), we obtain
lim
n→∞
logLk√
nD
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
) =
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρk [(1 + µ)D(Qk‖Q∅)− (1− µ)D(Pk‖P∅)]+ . (38)
Since µ in (21) is arbitrary, we conclude from Proposition 1 that the covert capacity region contains
the region defined by ⋃
{ρk}k∈K∈[0,1]K :∑k∈K ρk=1
{
{rk}k∈K : ∀k ∈ K, rk 6
√
2
χ (ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅)
}
. (39)
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In addition, any achievable covert throughput tuple r [K] that is characterized by a specific ρ and lies
on the boundary of the region defined in (39) is associated with an achievable key throughput tuple{√
2
χ(ρ)ρk [D(Qk‖Q∅)− D(Pk‖P∅)]+
}
k∈K
.
C. Converse proof
Proposition 2. For the channel model described in Section III, consider a sequence of covert communi-
cation schemes with increasing blocklength n ∈ N∗ characterized by n , Pne and δn , D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
such that limn→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ δn = 0. Then, there exists a vector ρ , {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K with∑
k∈K ρk = 1 and an infinite subset N ⊆ N∗, such that for all k ∈ K,
lim inf
n→∞
n∈N
logMk√
nδn
6
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅). (40)
For a sequence of codes that achieves the right hand side of (40) for all k ∈ K, we have
lim sup
n→∞
n∈N
logMkLk√
nδn
>
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Qk‖Q∅), (41)
for all k ∈ K.
Proof. Consider a sequence of covert communication schemes with increasing blocklength n characterized
by n , Pne and δn , D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
, and logMk takes the maximum value such that limn→∞ logMk =∞
for all k ∈ K. Each user k transmits an n−length codeword Xk = (Xk1, Xk2, . . . , Xkn) ∈ X n, where
n ∈ N∗, to the receiver. For j ∈ J1, nK, we denote the distribution of each symbol Xkj on X by ΠXkj ,
where
ΠXkj (x) ,
∑Mk
mk=1
∑Lk
`k=1
1{Xkj(mk, `k) = x}
MkLk
. (42)
We define ΠXkj (1) = 1−ΠXkj (0) , µ(n)kj . Note that µ(n)kj depends on n, the transmitter index k, and the
symbol position j. For every n ∈ N∗, we define a permutation pi(n)k∗ of J1, nK to define a new code such
that
(k∗, 1) = arg max
(k,j)∈K×J1,nKµ(n)kj . (43)
Since the channel is memoryless, the performance of the new code that satisfies (43) matches that of
the original code. Hence, without loss of generality, we only study the sequence of codes for which (43)
holds for every n ∈ N∗. Note that the sequence {{µ(n)k1 }k∈K}n∈N∗ belongs to [0, 1]K which is a closed
and bounded set. Hence, we can extract a convergent subsequence
{{µ(n)k1 }k∈K}n∈N ∗ , where N ∗ ⊆ N∗
is an infinite set, with limit {µ∗k1}k∈K. Let us now assume that the sequence {µ∗k1}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K is not
an all-zero sequence.
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For j ∈ J1, nK, we denote the K-length vector {xkj}k∈K by x(j)[K]. The warden makes an observation
Z of length n, whose distribution is denoted by Q̂n. For j ∈ J1, nK, we denote the distribution of each
component Zj of Z by Q̂j , where
Q̂j(z) ,
1∏
k∈KMkLk
∑
m[K]
∑
`[K]
WZ|X[K](z| {xkj(mk, `k)}k∈K) (44)
=
∑
x(j)[K]
(∏
k∈K
ΠXkj (xkj)
)
WZ|X[K]
(
z|x(j)[K]
)
(45)
(a)
=
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
k∈T
µ
(n)
kj
)(∏
k∈T c
(
1− µ(n)kj
))
QT (z), (46)
where (a) follows from the definition of QT (z) ,WZ|X[K](z|xT ) in (1). Alternatively, using Lemma 5
in the appendix, we write
Q̂j(z) = Q∅(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
(∏
k∈T
µ
(n)
kj
)
GT (z). (47)
From the definition of δn, we have
δn = D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
(48)
= −H(Z) + EQ̂n
(
log
1
Q⊗n∅ (Z)
)
(49)
= −
 n∑
j=1
H
(
Zj |Z j−1
)+ EQ̂n
 n∑
j=1
log
1
Q∅(Zj)
 (50)
(a)
>
n∑
j=1
(
−H(Zj) + EQ̂j
(
log
1
Q∅(Zj)
))
(51)
=
n∑
j=1
D
(
Q̂j‖Q∅
)
, (52)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. Since limn→∞ δn = 0 and KL
divergence is non-negative, it follows from (52) that
lim
n→∞D
(
Q̂j‖Q∅
)
= 0, (53)
for all j ∈ J1, nK. Applying Pinsker’s inequality on (53), we obtain limn→∞V(Q̂j , Q∅) = 0, which
implies that ∀z ∈ Z ,
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣Q̂j(z)−Q∅(z)∣∣∣ = 0, (54)
lim
n→∞ Q̂j(z) = Q∅(z). (55)
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Fixing j = 1 and by using (46) and (55), for n ∈ N ∗, we obtain
lim
n→∞
n∈N ∗
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
k∈T
µ
(n)
k1
)(∏
k∈T c
(
1− µ(n)k1
))
QT (z)
 = Q∅(z), (56)
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
k∈T
µ∗k1
)(∏
k∈T c
(1− µ∗k1)
)
QT (z) = Q∅(z). (57)
Since we assumed that the sequence {µ∗k1}k∈K is not an all-zero sequence, (57) implies that Q∅ is a
convex combination of {QT }T ⊆K: T 6=∅. Note that the convex combination in (57) does not require the
transmitters to coordinate, which is the case in our channel model, since the input from each user is
independent of the inputs from other users. Since (57) contradicts the assumption made in Section III,
our assumption about {µ∗k1}k∈K is incorrect, and we have
lim
n→∞
n∈N ∗
µ
(n)
k1 = 0, (58)
for all k ∈ K, which implies that
lim
n→∞
n∈N ∗
µ
(n)
k∗1 = 0. (59)
Subsequently, from (43) and (59), we obtain
lim
n→∞
n∈N ∗
µ
(n)
kj = 0, (60)
for all (k, j) ∈ K × J1, nK. Henceforth, we only consider the subsequence of codes with blocklength
n ∈ N ∗. Next, for j ∈ J1, nK, define
Ψ
(n)
j (z) , Q̂j(z)−Q∅(z). (61)
Note that
∑
z Ψ
(n)
j (z) = 0. Also note that from (54) and (61), we have limn→∞Ψ
(n)
j (z) = 0 for all
j ∈ J1, nK and ∀z ∈ Z . We lower bound D(Q̂j‖Q∅) for n large enough by
D
(
Q̂j‖Q∅
)
=
∑
z
Q̂j(z) log
Q̂j(z)
Q∅(z)
(62)
=
∑
z
Q∅(z)
(
1 +
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
Q∅(z)
)
log
(
1 +
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
Q∅(z)
)
(63)
(a)
>
∑
z

(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)2
2Q∅(z)
−
(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)3
2Q2∅(z)
+ ∑
z:Ψ
(n)
j (z)<0
2
(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)3
3Q2∅(z)
(64)
>
∑
z
(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)2
2Q∅(z)
1− Ψ(n)j (z)
Q∅(z)
−
4
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j (z)∣∣∣
3Q∅(z)
 , (65)
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where (a) follows from the inequality log (1 + x) > x− x22 for x > 0 and4 log (1 + x) > x− x
2
2 +
2x3
3
for x ∈ [−12 , 0]. For j ∈ J1, nK, define ξ(n)j (z) , Ψ(n)j (z)Q∅(z) + 4|Ψ(n)j (z)|3Q∅(z) and ξ(n)(z) , maxj∈J1,nK ξ(n)j (z).
Since limn→∞Ψ
(n)
j (z) = 0, we have limn→∞ ξ
(n)
j (z) = 0 for all j ∈ J1, nK. From (47) and (61), for
j ∈ J1, nK, we write ∣∣∣Ψ(n)j (z)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Q̂j(z)−Q∅(z)∣∣∣ (66)
6
∑
T ⊆K:T 6=∅
(∏
k∈T
µ
(n)
kj
)
|GT (z)| (67)
(a)
6 µ(n)k∗1
 ∑
T ⊆K:T 6=∅
|GT (z)|
 , (68)
where (a) follows from (43) and the fact that µ(n)kj ∈ [0, 1] for all k ∈ K and j ∈ J1, nK. Note that the
term inside the parentheses in (68) is positive and bounded. Consequently, for z ∈ Z ,
max
j∈J1,nK
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j (z)∣∣∣ 6 µ(n)k∗1
 ∑
T ⊆K:T 6=∅
|GT (z)|
 . (69)
From the definition of ξ(n)j (z), we have
ξ
(n)
j (z) =
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
Q∅(z)
+
4
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j (z)∣∣∣
3Q∅(z)
(70)
6
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j (z)∣∣∣
Q∅(z)
+
4
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j (z)∣∣∣
3Q∅(z)
(71)
=
7
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j (z)∣∣∣
3Q∅(z)
. (72)
Consequently, we have
ξ(n)(z) = max
j∈J1,nK ξ(n)j (z) (73)
6 7
3Q∅(z)
max
j∈J1,nK
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j (z)∣∣∣ (74)
6 7
3Q∅(z)
µ
(n)
k∗1
 ∑
T ⊆K:T 6=∅
|GT (z)|
 . (75)
4Note that for n large enough, we can ensure that Ψ(n)j (z) ∈
[− 1
2
, 0
]
if Ψ(n)j (z) < 0 since limn→∞Ψ
(n)
j (z) = 0.
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Note that, by definition, ξ(n)j (z) is non-negative irrespective of the sign of Ψ
(n)
j (z). Then, using (59)
and (75), we conclude that limn→∞
n∈N ∗ ξ
(n)(z) = 0. Using (65), we lower bound (52) by
δn >
n∑
j=1
∑
z
(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)2
2Q∅(z)
(
1− ξ(n)j (z)
)
(76)
>
∑
z
(
1− ξ(n)(z))
2Q∅(z)
n∑
j=1
(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)2
. (77)
For k ∈ K, we upper bound logMk using standard techniques,
logMk
(a)
6 I(Wk; YSk) +Hb (n) + n logMk (78)
6 I(WkSk; Y) +Hb (n) + n logMk (79)
= I(Xk; Y) +Hb (n) + n logMk (80)
= H(Xk)−H(Xk|Y) +Hb (n) + n logMk (81)
(b)
6 H(Xk|X [K \ {k}])−H(Xk|YX [K \ {k}]) +Hb (n) + n logMk (82)
= I(Xk; Y|X [K \ {k}]) +Hb (n) + n logMk (83)
= H(Y|X [K \ {k}])−H(Y|X[K]) +Hb (n) + n logMk (84)
(c)
6
n∑
j=1
H
(
Yj |X(j) [K \ {k}]
)− n∑
j=1
H
(
Yj |X(j)[K]
)
+Hb (n) + n logMk (85)
=
n∑
j=1
I
(
Xkj ;Yj |X(j) [K \ {k}]
)
+Hb (n) + n logMk, (86)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the fact that Xk and X[K\{k}] are mutually
independent and the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and (c) follows from the fact that conditioning
reduces entropy and the memoryless property of the channel. We expand the mutual information term
in (86) as
I
(
Xkj ;Yj |X(j) [K \ {k}]
)
=
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D
(
PT ‖WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xT [K\{k}]
)
(87)
=
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D(PT ‖P∅)
−
∑
y
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
PT (y) log
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xT [K \ {k}])
P∅(y)
. (88)
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Defining µ(n)max , µ(n)k∗1 and d1 , 2K maxT ⊆K:|T |>1D(PT ‖P∅), we upper bound the first term in (88) by∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D(PT ‖P∅)
(a)
=
∑
T ⊆K:
|T |>1
(∏
i∈T
µ
(n)
ij
)(∏
i∈T c
(
1− µ(n)ij
))
D(PT ‖P∅) +
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij
 ∏
i′∈K\{i}
(
1− µ(n)i′j
)D(Pi‖P∅) (89)
(b)
6 d1µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij +
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij D(Pi‖P∅), (90)
where (a) follows from splitting the sum into two based on the number of 1′s in xT , and (b) follows from
the fact that
(
1−µ(n)i′j
)
61 for all (i′, j)∈K×J1, nK. Defining d2,2K max
i∈K\{k}
D
(
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xi[K\{k}]‖P∅
)
,
we lower bound the second term in (88) by∑
y
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
PT (y) log
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xT [K \ {k}])
P∅(y)
=
∑
T ⊆K\{k}
 ∏
i∈K\{k}
ΠXij (xT ,i)
∑
y
∑
x
ΠXkj (x)WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]Xkj (y|xT [K\{k}]x)
× log WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xT [K\{k}])
P∅(y)
(91)
(a)
=
∑
T ⊆K\{k}
 ∏
i∈K\{k}
ΠXij (xT ,i)
D(WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xT [K\{k}]‖P∅) (92)
>
∑
T ⊆K\{k}:|T |=1
 ∏
i∈K\{k}
ΠXij (xT ,i)
D(WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xT [K\{k}]‖P∅) (93)
=
∑
i∈K\{k}
µ
(n)
ij
 ∏
i′∈K\{i,k}
(
1− µ(n)i′j
)D(WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xi[K\{k}]‖P∅) (94)
(b)
=
∑
i∈K\{k}
µ
(n)
ij
1 + ∑
T ⊆K\{i,k}
(−1)|T |
(∏
i′∈T
µ
(n)
i′j
)D(WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xi[K\{k}]‖P∅) (95)
>
∑
i∈K\{k}
µ
(n)
ij
1− ∑
T ⊆K\{i,k}: |T | is odd
(∏
i′∈T
µ
(n)
i′j
)D(WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xi[K\{k}]‖P∅) (96)
>
∑
i∈K\{k}
µ
(n)
ij
(
1− 2Kµ(n)max
)
D
(
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xi[K\{k}]‖P∅
)
(97)
>
∑
i∈K\{k}
µ
(n)
ij D
(
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xi[K\{k}]‖P∅
)− d2µ(n)max ∑
i∈K\{k}
µ
(n)
ij , (98)
where (a) follows from
∑
x
ΠXkj(x)WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]Xkj(y|xT [K\{k}]x) = WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xT [K \ {k}])
and (b) follows from the fact that
∏
i′∈K\{i,k} (1− µ(n)i′j ) = 1 +
∑
T ⊆K\{i,k} (−1)|T |
(∏
i′∈T µ
(n)
i′j
)
. Note
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that we can write WYj |X(j)[K\{k}](y|xi[K \ {k}]) = (1− µ(n)kj )Pi(y) + µ(n)kj P{i,k}(y). We define d3 ,∣∣∣∑y (P{i,k}(y)− Pi(y)) log Pi(y)P∅(y) ∣∣∣. Note that d3 is bounded since Pi  P∅. Then, we lower bound the
KL divergence term in (98) by
D
(
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xi[K\{k}]‖P∅
)
=
∑
y
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xi [K \ {k}]) log
Pi(y)
P∅(y)
+ D
(
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]=xi[K\{k}]‖Pi
)
(99)
>
∑
y
Pi(y)
(
1 + µ
(n)
kj
P{i,k}(y)− Pi(y)
Pi(y)
)
log
Pi(y)
P∅(y)
(100)
> D(Pi‖P∅)− d3µ(n)max. (101)
Defining d4 , d1 + d2 + d3 and combining (88), (90), (98), and (101), we obtain
I(Xkj ;Yj |Xj [K\{k}]) 6 µ(n)kj D(Pk‖P∅) + d4µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij . (102)
Next, we normalize logMk, where k ∈ K, by
√
nδn. Using (77), (86), and (102), for n large enough,
we obtain
logMk√
nδn
6
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj D(Pk‖P∅) + d4µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij +Hb (n)
(1− n)
√
n
∑
z
(1−ξ(n)(z))
2Q∅(z)
∑n
j=1
(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)2 (103)
6
(∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
)(
D(Pk‖P∅)
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
+ d4µ
(n)
max +
Hb(n)∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
)
(1− n)
√
n
∑
z
(1−ξ(n)(z))
2Q∅(z)
∑n
j=1
(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)2 (104)
=
D(Pk‖P∅)
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
+ d4µ
(n)
max +
Hb(n)∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
(1− n)
√
n
∑
z
(1−ξ(n)(z))
2Q∅(z)
∑n
j=1(Ψ
(n)
j (z))
2
(
∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij )
2
, (105)
(a)
6
D(Pk‖P∅)
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
+ d4µ
(n)
max +
Hb(n)∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
(1− n)
√∑
z
(1−ξ(n)(z))
2Q∅(z)
( ∑n
j=1 Ψ
(n)
j (z)∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
)2 , (106)
where (a) follows from the fact that n
∑n
j=1
(
Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)2
>
(∑n
j=1 Ψ
(n)
j (z)
)2
according to the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality. Note that since
(
1− ξ(n)(z)) is positive for n large enough, our application of
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in (106) is valid. From the definition of Ψ(n)j (z) in (61), we have
Ψ
(n)
j (z) =
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij Gi(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
|T |>2
(∏
k∈T
µ
(n)
kj
)
GT (z) (107)
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=
∑
i∈K
µ(n)ij Gi(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
i∈T ,|T |>2,
∀k∈T ,k>i
µ
(n)
ij
 ∏
k∈T \{i}
µ
(n)
kj
GT (z)
 (108)
=
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij
Gi(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
i∈T ,|T |>2,
∀k∈T ,k>i
 ∏
k∈T \{i}
µ
(n)
kj
GT (z)
 . (109)
Define d5 , 2K max
z∈Z
max
T ⊆K:|T |>1
|GT (z)|. If
∑
i∈K µ
(n)
ij Gi(z) 6 0, we upper bound (109) by
Ψ
(n)
j (z) 6
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij
(
Gi(z) + d5µ
(n)
max
)
, (110)
which is negative for n large enough. If
∑
i∈K µ
(n)
ij Gi(z) > 0, we lower bound (109) by
Ψ
(n)
j (z) >
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij
(
Gi(z)− d5µ(n)max
)
, (111)
which is positive for n large enough. Consequently, for n large enough, combining (106), (110) and (111),
we obtain
logMk√
nδn
6
D(Pk‖P∅)
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
+ d4µ
(n)
max +
Hb(n)∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
(1− n)
√∑
z
(1−ξ(n)(z))
2Q∅(z)
( ∑n
j=1 Ψ
(n)
j (z)∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
)2 (112)
=
D(Pk‖P∅)
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
+ d4µ
(n)
max +
Hb(n)∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
(1− n)
√∑
z
(1−ξ(n)(z))
2Q∅(z)
(∑
a∈K(Ga(z)+O(µ(n)max))
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
aj∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
)2 . (113)
Combining (86) and (102) with the fact that limn→∞
n∈N ∗ logMk =∞, we conclude that limn→∞n∈N ∗
∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1
µ
(n)
ij = ∞. Note that
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
aj∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
is bounded between 0 and 1 for any a ∈ K. We extract a con-
vergent subsequence
{ ∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
aj∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij
}
n∈N †
, where N † ⊆ N ∗ is an infinite set, with limit ρa. Note
that
∑
a∈K ρa = 1. Since we have assumed in Section III that there exists no {ρk}k∈K for which∑
k∈K ρkQk(z) = Q∅(z) for all z ∈ Z , the denominator in (113) is non-zero. Henceforth, we only
consider the subsequence of codes with blocklength n ∈ N †. Defining ρ , {ρk}k∈K, we obtain
from (113),
lim inf
n→∞
n∈N †
logMk√
nδn
6
√
2ρk
D(Pk‖P∅)√∑
z
(
∑
i∈K ρi(Qi(z)−Q∅(z)))
2
Q∅(z)
(114)
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(a)
=
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅), (115)
where (a) follows from the definition of χ(ρ).
Using standard techniques, we lower bound logMkLk, for k ∈ K, by
logMkLk = H(WkSk) (116)
> I(WkSk; Z) (117)
(a)
= I(Xk; Z) (118)
= I(X[K]; Z)− I(X [K \ {k}] ; Z|Xk), (119)
where (a) follows from the fact that Xk is a function of Wk and Sk. Defining d6 , 2K maxi∈KD(Qi‖Q∅),
we then lower bound the first term in (119) by
I(X[K]; Z) =
∑
x[K]
∑
z
(∏
i∈K
ΠnXi (xi)
)
W ⊗nZ|X[K] (z|x[K]) log
W ⊗nZ|X[K] (z|x[K])
Q̂n (z)
(120)
=
∑
x[K]
∑
z
(∏
i∈K
ΠnXi (xi)
)
W ⊗nZ|X[K] (z|x[K]) log
W ⊗nZ|X[K] (z|x[K])
Q⊗n∅ (z)
− δn (121)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
x(j)[K]
∑
z
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xij)
)
WZ|X[K](z|x(j)[K]) log
WZ|X[K](z|x(j)[K])
Q∅(z)
− δn (122)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈T
µ
(n)
ij
)(∏
i∈T c
(
1− µ(n)ij
))
D(QT ‖Q∅)− δn (123)
>
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij
 ∏
i′∈K\{i}
(
1− µ(n)i′j
)D(Qi‖Q∅)− δn (124)
(a)
>
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij D(Qi‖Q∅)− d6µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
n∑
j=1
µ
(n)
ij − δn, (125)
where (a) follows from the steps used to obtain (98) from (94). Note that, by definition, we have
∑
T ⊆K\{k}
 ∏
i∈K\{k}
ΠXij (xT ,i)
WZj |X(j)[K\{k}]Xkj (z|xT [K \ {k}]x) = WZj |Xkj (z|x). (126)
We upper bound the second term in (119) by
I(X [K \ {k}] ; Z|Xk)
= H(Z|Xk)−H(Z|X[K]) (127)
(a)
6
n∑
j=1
(
H(Zj |Xkj)−H
(
Zj |X(j)[K]
))
(128)
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=
n∑
j=1
I
(
X(j)[K \ {k}];Zj |Xkj
)
(129)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D
(
QT ‖WZj |Xkj=xT ,k
)
(130)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D(QT ‖Q∅)
−
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)∑
z
QT (z) log
WZj |Xkj (z|xT ,k)
Q∅(z)
(131)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D(QT ‖Q∅)
−
n∑
j=1
∑
x
ΠXkj (x)
∑
z
∑
T ⊆K\{k}
 ∏
i∈K\{k}
ΠXij (xT ,i)

×WZj |X(j)[K\{k}]Xkj (z|xT [K \ {k}]x) log
WZj |Xkj (z|x)
Q∅(z)
(132)
(b)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D(QT ‖Q∅)−
n∑
j=1
∑
x
ΠXkj (x)D
(
WZj |Xkj=x‖Q∅
)
(133)
6
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D(QT ‖Q∅)−
n∑
j=1
µ
(n)
kj D
(
WZj |Xkj=1‖Q∅
)
, (134)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and the memoryless property of the
channel, and (b) follows from (126). Defining d7 , 2K maxT ⊆K:|T |>1D(QT ‖Q∅), we upper bound the
first term in (134) by
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D(QT ‖Q∅)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈T
µ
(n)
ij
)(∏
i∈T c
(
1− µ(n)ij
))
D(QT ‖Q∅) (135)
(a)
6
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
i∈T
µ
(n)
ij
)
D(QT ‖Q∅) (136)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij D(Qi‖Q∅) +
n∑
j=1
∑
T ⊆K:
|T |>1
(∏
i∈T
µ
(n)
ij
)
D(QT ‖Q∅) (137)
6
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij D(Qi‖Q∅) + d7µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
n∑
j=1
µ
(n)
ij , (138)
where (a) follows from the fact that
(∏
i∈T c
(
1− µ(n)ij
))
6 1 for any T ⊆ K. Then, from Corollary 1,
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we write
WZj |Xkj (z|1) = Qk(z) +
∑
T ⊆K\{k}:
T 6=∅
(∏
i∈T
µ
(n)
ij
)∑
U⊆T
(−1)|T |−|U|QU∪{k}(z)
 . (139)
Defining d8 , 2K maxT ⊆K\{k}:T 6=∅
∣∣∣∣∣∑z ∑U⊆T (−1)|T |−|U|QU∪{k}(z) log Qk(z)Q∅(z)
∣∣∣∣∣ and using (139), we bound
the second KL divergence term in (134) by
D
(
WZj |Xkj=1‖Q∅
)
= D
(
WZj |Xkj=1‖Qk
)
+
∑
z
WZj |Xkj (z|1) log
Qk(z)
Q∅(z)
(140)
>
∑
z
Qk(z) + ∑
T ⊆K\{k}:
T 6=∅
(∏
i∈T
µ
(n)
ij
)∑
U⊆T
(−1)|T |−|U|QU∪{k}(z)

 log Qk(z)Q∅(z) (141)
> D(Qk‖Q∅)−
∑
T ⊆K\{k}:
T 6=∅
(∏
i∈T
µ
(n)
ij
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z
∑
U⊆T
(−1)|T |−|U|QU∪{k}(z)
 log Qk(z)
Q∅(z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (142)
> D(Qk‖Q∅)− d8µ(n)max. (143)
Defining d9 , d7 + d8 and combining (134), (138), and (143), we obtain
I(X [K \ {k}] ; Z|Xk) 6
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈K\{k}
µ
(n)
ij D(Qi‖Q∅) + d7µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
n∑
j=1
µ
(n)
ij + d8µ
(n)
max
n∑
j=1
µ
(n)
kj (144)
6
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈K\{k}
µ
(n)
ij D(Qi‖Q∅) + d9µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
n∑
j=1
µ
(n)
ij . (145)
Defining d10 , d6 + d9 and combining (125) and (145), we bound (119) by
logMkLk>
 n∑
j=1
µ
(n)
kj
D(Qk‖Q∅)− d10µ(n)max∑
i∈K
n∑
j=1
µ
(n)
ij −δn. (146)
Normalizing logMkLk, where k ∈ K, by
√
nδn, we obtain
logMkLk√
nδn
>
(∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj
)
D(Qk‖Q∅)− d10µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij − δn√
nδn
(147)
=
(∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj
)(
D(Qk‖Q∅)− d10µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj
− δn∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj
)
√
nδn
. (148)
Consider a sequence of codes for which (115) holds with equality for all k ∈ K. Proposition 1 confirms
the existence of such schemes. As a result, for an arbitrary ξ > 0, we have
lim inf
n→∞
n∈N †
logMk√
nδn
> (1− ξ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅). (149)
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Then, for that sequence of codes, using (86) and (102), we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
n∈N †
(∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj
)
D(Pk‖P∅)+d4µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
(∑n
j=1µ
(n)
ij
)
+Hb (n)
(1− n)
√
nδn
>(1− ξ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅), (150)
lim inf
n→∞
n∈N †
(∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj
)(
D(Pk‖P∅) + d4µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
ij∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj
)
(1− n)
√
nδn
>(1− ξ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅), (151)
lim inf
n→∞
n∈N †
(∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj
)
D(Pk‖P∅)√
nδn
>(1− ξ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅), (152)
lim inf
n→∞
n∈N †
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj√
nδn
>(1− ξ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρk. (153)
However, since lim supn→∞ an > lim infn→∞ an for any sequence {an}, we write
lim sup
n→∞
n∈N †
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj√
nδn
>(1− ξ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρk. (154)
Combining (148) and (154), we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
n∈N †
logMkLk√
nδn
> (1− ξ)
√
2
χ(ρ)
ρkD(Qk‖Q∅), (155)
for an arbitrary ξ > 0, where (a) follows from the fact that limn→∞
n∈N †
∑n
j=1 µ
(n)
kj = ∞. Letting ξ ↓ 0
in (155), we obtain (41).
Note that for any sequence {an}n∈N∗ and any infinite set N ⊆ N∗, we have, by definition,
lim inf
n→∞ an 6 lim infn→∞
n∈N
an 6 lim sup
n→∞
n∈N
an 6 lim sup
n→∞
an. (156)
From Proposition 2 and equation (156), we conclude that the covert capacity region is contained in the
region defined by ⋃
{ρk}k∈K∈[0,1]K :∑k∈K ρk=1
{
{rk}k∈K : ∀k ∈ K, rk 6
√
2
χ (ρ)
ρkD(Pk‖P∅)
}
, (157)
and that, any achievable covert throughput tuple r [K] characterized by a specific ρ and lying on the
boundary of the region defined in (157) is associated to an achievable key throughput of at least√
2
χ(ρ)ρk [D(Qk‖Q∅)− D(Pk‖P∅)]+ for each k ∈ K.
VI. CONCLUSION
We conclude with a discussion of extensions of our results and related problems of interest.
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We confirm that our proof techniques and results extend to multiple non-innocent symbols as in [5,
Theorem 2] and [6, Corollary 3]. However, our relatively concise notation for the subscript of the one-
shot output distributions P and Q heavily relies on the fact that users who transmit can only transmit a
uniquely defined information symbol. This allows us to index the distributions with the set of transmitting
users. In the presence of multiple information symbols, this ease of notation is lost, and one needs to
keep track of not only which user is transmitting but also what symbol is transmitted. That being said, the
key conceptual results that lead to our characterization hold as in [5], [6]. For more details, the interested
reader can refer to Appendix G.
Our resolvability analysis is not directly applicable to AWGN channels since we use νmin , minz Q∅(z)
in the denominator of (255) and (288), which is zero for AWGN channels. However, our achievability
results can be extended to AWGN channels by using resolvability exponents as in [40], [41], [42] to
obtain a bound for the KL divergence D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
that does not rely on the discrete or continuous nature
of the channel output alphabet. The converse argument can be developed by extending the approach of [5]
to deal with multiple users, and one expects the covert capacity region to be⋃
{ρk}k∈K:∑k ρk=1
{{rk}k∈K : rk 6 ρk} .
For more details, the reader can refer to Appendix H.
A final problem of interest is the characterization of the covert capacity region of a K-user MAC in
which the transmitters share a common key. Unlike the situation addressed here, the common key scenario
captures the ability of users to coordinate their covert transmissions. One can approach the problem by
following cooperative channel resolvability techniques studied in [43], [44].
APPENDIX A
ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATION OF Qαn IN EQ. (11)
Lemma 5. For any set S ⊆ K, define GS(z) ,
∑
T ⊆S (−1)|S|−|T |QT (z). Then,
Qαn(z) = Q∅(z) +
∑
S⊆K:
S6=∅
(∏
k∈S
ρkαn
)
GS(z). (158)
Proof. First, we prove the following statement by induction. For any set S and βk ∈ [0, 1] for k ∈ K,∏
k∈S
(1− βk) = 1 +
∑
T ⊆S:
T 6=∅
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
. (159)
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It is straightforward to show that (159) is true for S = {1}. When S = {1, 2}, we have∏
k∈{1,2}
(1− βk) = 1 +
∑
T ⊆{1,2}:
T 6=∅
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
(160)
= 1− β1 − β2 + β1β2. (161)
We assume that (159) is true for the set S , J1,K − 1K, where K ∈ N∗. Then, for the set S ′ , S∪{K},
we have∏
k∈S′
(1− βk) = (1− βK)
∏
k∈S
(1− βk) (162)
= (1− βK)
1 + ∑
T ⊆S:
T 6=∅
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
) (163)
= 1− βK +
∑
T ⊆S:
T 6=∅
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
− βK
∑
T ⊆S:
T 6=∅
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
) (164)
(a)
= 1 +
∑
T ={K}
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
+
∑
T ⊆S:
|T |=1
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
+
∑
T ⊆S:
|T |>1
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
+
∑
T ⊆S′:
|T |>1, K∈T
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
(165)
(b)
= 1 +
∑
T ⊆S′:
|T |=1
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
+
∑
T ⊆S′:
|T |>1, K 6∈T
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
+
∑
T ⊆S′:
|T |>1, K∈T
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
(166)
= 1 +
∑
T ⊆S′:
|T |=1
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
+
∑
T ⊆S′:
|T |>1
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
(167)
= 1 +
∑
T ⊆S′:
T 6=∅
(−1)|T |
(∏
k∈T
βk
)
, (168)
where (a) follows from the fact that (−βK)
(∑
T ⊆S:
T 6=∅
(−1)|T | (∏k∈T βk)) = ∑ T ⊆S′:
|T |>1, K∈T
(−1)|T |(∏
k∈T βk
)
, and (b) follows from the fact that
∑
T ⊆S:
|T |>1
(−1)|T | (∏k∈T βk) = ∑ T ⊆S′:
|T |>1, K 6∈T
(−1)|T |
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(∏
k∈T βk
)
. From the definition of Qαn in (8), we have
Qαn(z) =
∑
x[K]
(∏
k∈K
ΠXk(xk)
)
WZ|X[K](z|x[K]) (169)
=
∑
T ⊆K
(∏
k∈T
ρkαn
)(∏
k∈T c
(1− ρkαn)
)
QT (z) (170)
=
(∏
k∈K
(1− ρkαn)
)
Q∅(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
(∏
k∈T
ρkαn
)(∏
k∈T c
(1− ρkαn)
)
QT (z) (171)
(a)
=
(∏
k∈K
(1− ρkαn)
)
Q∅(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
(∏
k∈T
ρkαn
)1 + ∑
U⊆T c:
U 6=∅
(−1)|U|
(∏
k∈U
ρkαn
)QT (z)
(172)
=
(∏
k∈K
(1− ρkαn)
)
Q∅(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
(∏
k∈T
ρkαn
)∑
U⊆T c
(−1)|U|
(∏
k∈U
ρkαn
)QT (z),
(173)
where (a) follows from (159). Since T and U are disjoint sets, it follows from (173) that
Qαn(z) =
(∏
k∈K
(1− ρkαn)
)
Q∅(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
(∏
k∈T
ρkαn
)∑
S⊆K:
T ⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |
 ∏
k∈(S\T )
ρkαn

QT (z)
(174)
(a)
= Q∅(z) +
∑
S⊆K:
S6=∅
(−1)|S|
(∏
k∈S
ρkαn
)
Q∅(z) +
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
∑
S⊆K:
T ⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |
(∏
k∈S
ρkαn
)QT (z)
(175)
= Q∅(z) +
∑
S⊆K:
S6=∅
(−1)|S|
(∏
k∈S
ρkαn
)
Q∅(z) +
∑
S⊆K:
S6=∅
(∏
k∈S
ρkαn
)∑
T ⊆S:
T 6=∅
(−1)|S|−|T |QT (z)

(176)
= Q∅(z) +
∑
S⊆K:
S6=∅
(∏
k∈S
ρkαn
)∑
T ⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |QT (z)
 , (177)
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where (a) follows from (159). Defining GS(z) ,
∑
T ⊆S (−1)|S|−|T |QT (z), we obtain
Qαn(z) = Q∅(z) +
∑
S⊆K:
S6=∅
(∏
k∈S
ρkαn
)
GS(z). (178)
Corollary 1. For any set S ⊆ K, define GS(z) ,
∑
T ⊆S (−1)|S|−|T |QT (z). Then,
WZ|Xk(z|1) = Qk(z) +
∑
S⊆K\{k}:
S6=∅
(∏
i∈S
ρiαn
)∑
T ⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |QT ∪{k}(z)
 . (179)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From the definition of D(Qαn‖Q∅), we have
D(Qαn‖Q∅) =
∑
z
Qαn(z) log
Qαn(z)
Q∅(z)
(180)
=
∑
z
Q∅(z)
(
1 +
αnζn(z)
Q∅(z)
)
log
(
1 +
αnζn(z)
Q∅(z)
)
. (181)
Since log (1 + x) < x− x22 + x
3
3 , for x > −1, we upper bound (181) by
D(Qαn‖Q∅)6
∑
z
Q∅(z)
(
1 +
αnζn(z)
Q∅(z)
)(
αnζn(z)
Q∅(z)
− α
2
nζ
2
n(z)
2Q2∅(z)
+
α3nζ
3
n(z)
3Q3∅(z)
)
(182)
(a)
=
∑
z
α2n
2
(
ζ2n(z)
Q∅(z)
− αnζ
3
n(z)
3Q2∅(z)
+
2α2nζ
4
n(z)
3Q3∅(z)
)
, (183)
where, (a) follows from the fact that
∑
z ζn(z) = 0 from the definition of ζn. Since limn→∞ αn = 0,
αn is small enough for a sufficiently large n and
αnζn(z)
Q∅(z)
∈ [−12 , 0] for any z ∈ Z if ζn(z) < 0. Then,
we lower bound (181) by
D(Qαn‖Q∅)
(a)
>
∑
z
Q∅(z)
(
1 +
αnζn(z)
Q∅(z)
)(
αnζn(z)
Q∅(z)
− α
2
nζ
2
n(z)
2Q2∅(z)
)
+
∑
z:ζn(z)<0
Q∅(z)
(
1 +
αnζn(z)
Q∅(z)
)(
2α3nζ
3
n(z)
3Q3∅(z)
)
(184)
(b)
>
∑
z
α2n
2
(
ζ2n(z)
Q∅(z)
− αnζ
3
n(z)
Q2∅(z)
)
+
∑
z:ζn(z)<0
2α3nζ
3
n(z)
3Q2∅(z)
, (185)
where, (a) follows from the inequalities log (1 + x) > x− x22 for x > 0 and log (1 + x) > x− x
2
2 +
2x3
3
for x ∈ [−12 , 0], and (b) follows from the fact that ∑z ζn(z) = 0. For n large enough, we loosen the
bounds in (183) and (185) to obtain
α2n
2
(1 +
√
αn)χn(ρ) > D(Qαn‖Q∅) >
α2n
2
(1−√αn)χn(ρ). (186)
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From the definition of Qαn , we have
Qαn(z) = Q∅(z) + αn
(∑
k∈K
ρk (Qk(z)−Q∅(z))
)
+O (α2n) . (187)
Using the definition of ζn and applying the limit, we obtain
lim
n→∞ ζn(z) = limn→∞
Qαn(z)−Q∅(z)
αn
(188)
= lim
n→∞
(∑
k∈K
ρk (Qk(z)−Q∅(z)) +O (αn)
)
(189)
(a)
=
∑
k∈K
ρk (Qk(z)−Q∅(z)) (190)
= ζ(z), (191)
where (a) follows from the fact that limn→∞ αn = 0. From (191) and the definition of χn(ρ), it follows
that
lim
n→∞χn(ρ) = limn→∞
∑
z
ζ2n(z)
Q∅(z)
=
∑
z
ζ2(z)
Q∅(z)
= χ(ρ). (192)
Finally, for a non-empty set T ⊆ K, define λn,T (z) , WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ])−Q∅(z)αn . Note that
∑
z λn,T (z) = 0.
Then, for any non-empty set T ⊆ K, we have
I(X[T ];Z) =
∑
x[T ]
∑
z
(∏
k∈T
ΠXk (xk)
)
WZ|X[T ] (z|x[T ]) log
(
WZ|X[T ] (z|x[T ])
Qαn(z)
)
(193)
=
∑
x[T ]
∑
z
(∏
k∈T
ΠXk (xk)
)
WZ|X[T ] (z|x[T ]) log
(
WZ|X[T ] (z|x[T ])
Q∅(z)
)
− D(Qαn‖Q∅)
(194)
(a)
=
∑
U⊆T :
|U|>1
(∏
k∈U
ρkαn
)(∏
k∈Uc
(1− ρkαn)
)∑
z
WZ|X[T ] (z|xU [T ]) log
(
WZ|X[T ] (z|xU [T ])
Q∅(z)
)
+
∑
k∈T
ρkαn
∏
i∈T :
i 6=k
(1− ρiαn)
∑
z
WZ|X[T ]
(
z|x{k}[T ]
)
log
(
WZ|X[T ]
(
z|x{k}[T ]
)
Q∅(z)
)
+
(∏
k∈T
(1− ρkαn)
)∑
z
WZ|X[T ] (z|x∅ [T ]) log
(
WZ|X[T ] (z|x∅ [T ])
Q∅(z)
)
− D(Qαn‖Q∅)
(195)
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=
∑
k∈T
ρkαn
∏
i∈T :
i 6=k
(1− ρiαn)
∑
z
WZ|X[T ]
(
z|x{k}[T ]
)
log
(
WZ|X[T ]
(
z|x{k}[T ]
)
Q∅(z)
)
+
(∏
k∈T
(1− ρkαn)
)∑
z
(Q∅(z) + αnλn,T (z)) log
(
1 + αn
λn,T (z)
Q∅(z)
)
− D(Qαn‖Q∅) +O
(
α2n
)
(196)
(b)
=
∑
k∈T
ρkαn
∑
z
WZ|X[T ]
(
z|x{k}[T ]
)
log
(
WZ|X[T ]
(
z|x{k}[T ]
)
Q∅(z)
)
−D(Qαn‖Q∅) +O
(
α2n
)
(197)
=
∑
k∈T
ρkαn
∑
z
(Qk(z) +O (αn)) log
(
Qk(z) +O (αn)
Q∅(z)
)
− D(Qαn‖Q∅) +O
(
α2n
)
(198)
=
∑
k∈T
ρkαn
∑
z
Qk(z) log
((
Qk(z)
Q∅(z)
)(
1 +
O (αn)
Qk(z)
))
− D(Qαn‖Q∅) +O
(
α2n
)
(199)
=
∑
k∈T
ρkαn
(
D(Qk‖Q∅) +
∑
z
Qk(z) log
(
1 +
O (αn)
Qk(z)
))
− D(Qαn‖Q∅) +O
(
α2n
)
(200)
=
∑
k∈T
ρkαnD(Qk‖Q∅)− D(Qαn‖Q∅) +O
(
α2n
)
, (201)
where (a) follows from splitting the first term in (194) into three based on the number of users sending
symbol 1, and (b) follows from the fact that the second term in (196) can be reduced to O (α2n) by
expanding log
(
1 + αn
λn,T (z)
Q∅(z)
)
using Taylor series.
APPENDIX C
BERNSTEIN’S INEQUALITY
Lemma 6. Let {Ui}ni=1 be independent zero-mean random variables such that |Ui| 6 c for a finite c > 0
almost surely for all i ∈ J1, nK. Then, for any t > 0,
P
(
n∑
i=1
Ui > t
)
6 exp
(
−
1
2 t
2∑n
i=1 E
(
U2i
)
+ 13ct
)
. (202)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The K users encode messages W [K] = m[K] using keys S[K] = `[K] into codewords xK (m[K], `[K])
and transmit them over a discrete memoryless MAC. The following two events lead to a decoding error.
• The transmitted codewords do not satisfy (xK (m[K], `[K]) , y) ∈ Anγ .
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• A different message vector m˜[K] 6= m[K] exists such that (xK (m˜[K], `[K]) , y) ∈ Anγ .
Define the event
Em[K] ,
{
(XK (m[K], `[K]) ,Y) ∈ Anγ
}
. (203)
The probability of decoding error at the legitimate receiver averaged over all random codebooks is given
by
E(Pne ) = P
(
Ŵ [K] 6= W [K]
)
(204)
= E
 1(∏
k∈KMk
) ∑
m[K]
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|XK (m[K], `[K]))1
Ecm[K] ∪ ⋃
m˜[K]6=m[K]
Em˜[K]


(205)
(a)
6 E
 1(∏
k∈KMk
) ∑
m[K]
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|XK (m[K], `[K]))1
{
Ecm[K]
}
+ E
 1(∏
k∈KMk
) ∑
m[K]
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|XK (m[K], `[K]))
∑
m˜[K]6=m[K]
1
{Em˜[K]}
, (206)
where (a) follows from the application of the union bound. We bound the first term in (206) by
E
 1(∏
k∈KMk
) ∑
m[K]
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|XK (m[K], `[K]))1
{
Ecm[K]
}
=
∑
x[K]
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|x[K])
(∏
k∈K
Π⊗nXk (xk)
)
1
{
(x[K], y) ∈ Anγ c
}
(207)
= PW ⊗nY |X[K](
∏
k∈K Π
⊗n
Xk
)
(Anγ c) (208)
(a)
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
PW ⊗nY |X[K](
∏
k∈K Π
⊗n
Xk
)
(AnγT c) (209)
=
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
PW ⊗nY |X[K](
∏
k∈K Π
⊗n
Xk
)
(
log
W ⊗nY |X[K] (Y|X[K])
W ⊗nY |X[T c] (Y|X[T c])
< γT
)
(210)
=
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
PW ⊗nY |X[K](
∏
k∈K Π
⊗n
Xk
)
(
n∑
i=1
log
WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])
WY |X[T c] (Y |X[T c])
< γT
)
, (211)
where (a) follows from the fact that Anγ c =
⋃
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
AnγT c and the application of the union bound. We
define a zero-mean5 random variable UT , I(X[T ];Y |X[T c])− log WY |X[K](Y |X[K])WY |X[T c](Y |X[T c]) . Note that |UT | is
5since E
(
log
WY |X[K](Y |X[K])
WY |X[T c](Y |X[T c])
)
= I(X[T ];Y |X[T c]).
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bounded almost surely, and
E
(
U2T
)
= E
(
log2
WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])
WY |X[T c] (Y |X[T c])
)
− (I (X[T ];Y |X[T c]))2 . (212)
Let us analyze the expectation term on the right hand side of (212).
E
(
log2
WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])
WY |X[T c] (Y |X[T c])
)
=
∑
y
∑
x[K]
(∏
k∈K
ΠXk (xk)
)
WY |X[K] (y|x[K]) log2
WY |X[K] (y|x[K])
WY |X[T c] (y|x[T c])
(213)
(a)
=
∑
y
∑
x[K] 6=x∅[K]
(∏
k∈K
ΠXk (xk)
)
WY |X[K] (y|x[K]) log2
WY |X[K] (y|x[K])
WY |X[T c] (y|x[T c])
+
∑
y
(∏
k∈K
(1− ρkαn)
)
P∅(y) log2
P∅(y)
WY |X[T c] (y|x∅[T c])
(214)
(b)
=
∑
y
(∏
k∈K
(1− ρkαn)
)
P∅(y) log2
P∅(y)
WY |X[T c] (y|x∅[T c])
+O (αn) (215)
(c)
=
∑
y
P∅(y) log2
WY |X[T c] (y|x∅[T c])
P∅(y)
+O (αn) , (216)
where (a) follows from splitting the first sum on the right hand side of (213) into two based on whether
x [K] equals x∅ [K] or not, (b) follows from the fact that the first term in (214) is on the order of αn
since at least one of the symbols in x [K] is a 1, and (c) follows from the expansion of the product term
and the fact that log2 P∅(y)WY |X[T c](y|x∅[T c]) = log
2 WY |X[T c](y|x∅[T c])
P∅(y)
. Expanding the numerator in the log2
term in (216), we obtain
WY |X[T c] (y|x∅[T c]) =
∑
x[T ]
(∏
k∈T
ΠXk (x [{k}])
)
WY |X[T c]X[T ] (y|x∅ [T c]x [T ]) (217)
=
∑
x[T ] 6=x∅[T ]
(∏
k∈T
ΠXk (x [{k}])
)
WY |X[T c]X[T ] (y|x∅ [T c]x [T ])
+
(∏
k∈T
(1− ρkαn)
)
P∅(y) (218)
(a)
= P∅(y) +O (αn) , (219)
where (a) follows from the fact that the first term in (218) is on the order of αn since at least one of
the symbols in x [T ] is a 1 and from the expansion of the product term. Combining (216) and (219), we
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obtain
E
(
log2
WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])
WY |X[T c] (Y |X[T c])
)
=
∑
y
P∅(y) log2
(
1 +
O (αn)
P∅(y)
)
+O (αn) (220)
(a)
= O (αn) , (221)
where (a) follows from using the Taylor series of the log term. Let us now analyze the mutual information
term on the right hand side of (212).
I (X[T ];Y |X[T c]) = I(X[K];Y )− I(X[T c];Y ) (222)
(a)
=
∑
k∈K
ρkαnD(Pk‖P∅)−
∑
k∈T c
ρkαnD(Pk‖P∅) +O
(
α2n
)
(223)
=
∑
k∈T
ρkαnD(Pk‖P∅) +O
(
α2n
)
, (224)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1. Using the definition of γT , for an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1), we upper
bound (211) using Bernstein’s inequality as follows.
E
 1(∏
k∈KMk
) ∑
m[K]
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|XK (m[K], 1[K]))1
{
Ecm[K]
}
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
PW ⊗nY |X[K](
∏
k∈K Π
⊗n
Xk
)
(
n∑
i=1
log
WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])
WY |X[T c] (Y |X[T c])
< γT
)
(225)
=
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
P
(
n∑
i=1
UT > µnI(X[T ];Y |X[T c])
)
(226)
(a)
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
exp
(
−
1
2 (µnI(X[T ];Y |X[T c]))2
nO (αn) + 13cµnI(X[T ];Y |X[T c])
)
(227)
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
exp (−c1nαn) (228)
(b)
6 exp (−c2nαn) , (229)
for appropriate constants c, c1, c2 > 0, where (a) follows from using Bernstein’s inequality, and (b)
follows from the fact that, for a finite K, there exist 2K − 1 non-empty subsets of K. Denoting the
|T |-length vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) by 1[T ] for any non-empty set T ⊆ K, we upper bound the second term
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in (206) by
E
 1(∏
k∈KMk
) ∑
m[K]
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|XK (m[K], `[K]))
∑
m˜[K] 6=m[K]
1
{Em˜[K]}

(a)
= E
 1(∏
k∈KMk
) ∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
∑
m[T ]
∑
m[T c]
∑
m˜[T ]:
m˜k 6=mk,∀k∈T
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|XK (m[K], `[K]))1
{Em˜[T ]m[T c]}

(230)
(b)
=
∑
y
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
∑
m˜[T ]:
m˜k 6=1,∀k∈T
∑
xK(1[K],`[K])
∑
xT (m˜[T ],`[T ])
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|xK (1[K], `[K]))
(∏
k∈K
Π⊗nXk (xk (1, `k))
)
×
(∏
k∈T
Π⊗nXk (xk (m˜k, `k))
)
1
{
(xT (m˜[T ], `[T ]) , xT c (1[T c], `[T c]) , y) ∈ Anγ
}
(231)
=
∑
y
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
∑
m˜[T ]:
m˜k 6=1,∀k∈T
∑
xT c (1[T c],`[T c])
∑
xT (m˜[T ],`[T ])
W ⊗nY |X[T c] (y|xT c (1[T c], `[T c]))
(∏
k∈T c
Π⊗nXk (xk (1, `k))
)
×
(∏
k∈T
Π⊗nXk (xk (m˜k, `k))
)
1
{
(xT (m˜[T ], `[T ]) , xT c (1[T c], `[T c]) , y) ∈ Anγ
}
(232)
(c)
6
∑
y
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
∑
m˜[T ]:
m˜k 6=1,∀k∈T
∑
xT c (1[T c],`[T c])
∑
xT (m˜[T ],`[T ])
W ⊗nY |X[T c] (y|xT c (1[T c], `[T c]))
(∏
k∈T c
Π⊗nXk (xk (1, `k))
)
×
(∏
k∈T
Π⊗nXk (xk (m˜k, `k))
)
1
{
(xT (m˜[T ], `[T ]) , xT c (1[T c], `[T c]) , y) ∈ AnγT
}
(233)
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
e−γT
(∏
k∈T
Mk
)∑
y
∑
x[K]
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|x[K])
(∏
k∈K
Π⊗nXk (xk)
) (234)
=
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
e−γT
(∏
k∈T
Mk
)
, (235)
where (a) follows from rewriting the left hand side of (230) in terms of the positions in which the two
vectors m [K] and m˜ [K] do not match, (b) follows from setting m [K] = 1 [K] without loss of generality,
and (c) follows from the fact that Anγ in the indicator function of (232) is a subset of AnγT in the indicator
function of (233) by definition of Anγ . Combining (229) and (235), we upper bound (206) by
E(Pne ) 6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
e−γT
(∏
k∈T
Mk
)
+ exp (−c2nαn) . (236)
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Using the definition of γT , (224) and (236), we conclude that for an arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1) and n large
enough, if ∑
k∈T
logMk = (1− δ) (1− µ)nαn
∑
k∈T
ρkD(Pk‖P∅), (237)
for every non-empty set T ⊆ K, then there exists a constant ξ > 0 such that
E(Pne ) 6 exp (−ξnαn) . (238)
If T is a singleton set {k}, where k ∈ K, it follows from (237) that
logMk = (1− δ) (1− µ) ρknαnD(Pk‖P∅). (239)
Observing (237) and (239), we conclude that (237) is automatically satisfied for every non-empty set
T ⊆ K, if logMk satisfies (239) for every k ∈ K.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Define the set Bnη ,
⋂
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
BnηT with
BnηT ,
{
(x[T ], z) ∈ X n[T ]×Zn : log
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (z|x[T ])
Q⊗nαn (z)
6 ηT
}
, (240)
where
ηT , (1 + µ)nI(X[T ];Z), (241)
for every non-empty set T ⊆ K and an arbitrary µ > 0. For (m[K], `[K]) ∈ ×Kk=1J1,MkK××Kk=1J1, LkK,
E∼(m[K],`[K]) denotes the expectation taken over all
{
XK
(
m˜[K], ˜`[K])}(m˜[K],˜`[K])∈(×Kk=1J1,MkK××Kk=1J1,LkK):
(m˜[K],˜`[K]) 6=(m[K],`[K])
.
Let us analyze the KL divergence between Q̂n and Q⊗nαn averaged over all random codebooks.
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
= E
(∑
z
Q̂n (z) log
Q̂n (z)
Q⊗nαn (z)
)
(242)
= E
∑
z
∑
m[K]
∑`
[K]
W ⊗nZ|X[K] (z|XK (m[K], `[K]))( ∏
k∈K
MkLk
) log

∑˜
m[K]
∑˜
`[K]
W ⊗nZ|X[K]
(
z|XK
(
m˜[K], ˜`[K]))( ∏
k∈K
MkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)

 (243)
(a)
6
∑
z
∑
m[K]
∑
`[K]
∑
xK(m[K],`[K])
W ⊗nZ|X[K] (z|xK (m[K], `[K]))
(∏
k∈KΠ
⊗n
Xk
(xk (mk, `k))
)(∏
k∈KMkLk
)
× logE∼(m[K],`[K])
∑m˜[K]∑˜`[K]W ⊗nZ|X[K]
(
z|XK
(
m˜[K], ˜`[K]))(∏
k∈KMkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
 , (244)
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where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality. Let us analyze the log term in (244).
logE∼(m[K],`[K])
∑m˜[K]∑˜`[K]W ⊗nZ|X[K]
(
z|XK
(
m˜[K], ˜`[K]))(∏
k∈KMkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)

= log

∑
T ⊆K
∑
m˜[T c]:m˜k 6=mk,∀k∈T c
∑˜`[T c]:˜`k 6=`k,∀k∈T c∑xT c(m˜[T c],˜`[T c])
WZ|X[T ]X[T c]
(
z|xT (m [T ] , ` [T ]) xT c
(
m˜ [T c] , ˜`[T c]))(∏k∈T c Π⊗nXk (xk (m˜k, ˜`k)))(∏
k∈KMkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)

(245)
(a)
= log

∑
T ⊆K: T 6=∅
∑
m˜[T c]:m˜k 6=mk,∀k∈T c
∑˜`[T c]:˜`k 6=`k,∀k∈T c∑xT c(m˜[T c],˜`[T c])
WZ|X[T ]X[T c]
(
z|xT (m [T ] , ` [T ]) xT c
(
m˜ [T c] , ˜`[T c]))(∏k∈T c Π⊗nXk (xk (m˜k, ˜`k)))(∏
k∈KMkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
+
∑
m˜[K]:m˜k 6=mk,∀k∈K
∑˜`[K]:˜`k 6=`k,∀k∈K∑xK(m˜[K],˜`[K])
WZ|X[K]
(
z|xK
(
m˜ [K] , ˜`[K]))(∏k∈KΠ⊗nXk (xk (m˜k, ˜`k)))(∏
k∈KMkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
 (246)
(b)
= log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (z|xT (m[T ], `[T ]))(∏
k∈T MkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
+
∑
m˜[K]:m˜k 6=mk,∀k∈K
∑˜`[K]:˜`k 6=`k,∀k∈KQ⊗nαn (z)(∏
k∈KMkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)

(247)
6 log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (z|xT (m[T ], `[T ]))(∏
k∈T MkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
+ 1
 (248)
= log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (z|xT (m[T ], `[T ]))(∏
k∈T MkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
+ 1
1{(xK (m[K], `[K]) , z) ∈ Bnη}
+ log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (z|xT (m[T ], `[T ]))(∏
k∈T MkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
+ 1
1{(xK (m[K], `[K]) , z) 6∈ Bnη} , (249)
where (a) follows from splitting the numerator term in (245) into two based on whether T is empty or not
and (b) follows from the fact that
∑
xK(m˜[K],˜`[K])WZ|X[K]
(
z|xK
(
m˜ [K] , ˜`[K]))( ∏
k∈K
Π⊗nXk
(
xk
(
m˜k, ˜`k)))
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= Q⊗nαn (z). We upper bound the first term in (249) by
log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (z|xT (m[T ], `[T ]))(∏
k∈T MkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
+ 1
1{(xK (m[K], `[K]) , z) ∈ Bnη}
6 log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
eηT(∏
k∈T MkLk
) + 1
 (250)
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
eηT(∏
k∈T MkLk
) . (251)
Defining νmin , minz Q∅(z), we upper bound the second term in (249) by
log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (z|xT (m[T ], `[T ]))(∏
k∈T MkLk
)
Q⊗nαn (z)
+ 1
1{(xK (m[K], `[K]) , z) 6∈ Bnη}
6
log( 1Q⊗nαn (z)
)
+ log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (z|xT (m[T ], `[T ]))(∏
k∈T MkLk
) +Q⊗nαn(z)


× 1{(xK (m[K], `[K]) , z) 6∈ Bnη} (252)
(a)
6
n log
(
1(∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn)
)
νmin
)
+ log
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
1 + 1

1{(xK (m[K], `[K]) , z) 6∈ Bnη}
(253)
(b)
6
(
n log
(
1(∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn)
)
νmin
)
+ log
(
2K
))
1
{
(xK (m[K], `[K]) , z) 6∈ Bnη
}
(254)
6 n log
(
2K(∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn)
)
νmin
)
1
{
(xK (m[K], `[K]) , z) 6∈ Bnη
}
, (255)
where (a) follows from the fact that we can upper bound both
W ⊗nZ|X[T ](z|xT (m[T ],`[T ]))
(
∏
k∈T MkLk)
and Q⊗nαn(z) by 1
and (b) follows from the fact that there only exist 2K − 1 non-empty subsets of K. Combining (251)
and (255), we upper bound (244) by
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6
∑
z
Q⊗nαn (z)
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
eηT(∏
k∈T MkLk
)
+ n log( 2K∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn) νmin
)
P
(Bnη c)
(256)
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=
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
eηT(∏
k∈T MkLk
) + n log( 2K∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn) νmin
)
P
(Bnη c). (257)
From the definition of Bnη , we obtain
P
(Bnη c) 6 ∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
P
(BnηT c), (258)
which follows from the fact that Bnη c =
⋃
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
BnηT c and the application of the union bound. We define
a zero-mean random variable VT , log WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])Qαn (Z) − I(X[T ];Z) since E
(
log
WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])
Qαn (Z)
)
=
I(X[T ];Z). Note that |VT | is bounded almost surely, and
E
(
V 2T
)
= E
(
log2
WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])
Qαn(Z)
)
− (I(X [T ] ;Z))2 (259)
(a)
= E
(
log2
WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])
Qαn(Z)
)
+O (α2n) , (260)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1. Let us analyze the expectation term in (260).
E
(
log2
WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])
Qαn(Z)
)
=
∑
z
∑
x[T ]
(∏
k∈T
ΠXk(xk)
)
WZ|X[T ](z|x[T ]) log2
WZ|X[T ](z|x[T ])
Qαn(z)
(261)
(a)
=
∑
z
(∏
k∈T
(1− ρkαn)
)
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ]) log2
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ])
Qαn(z)
+
∑
z
∑
x[T ] 6=x∅[T ]
(∏
k∈T
ΠXk(xk)
)
WZ|X[T ](z|x[T ]) log2
WZ|X[T ](z|x[T ])
Qαn(z)
(262)
(b)
=
∑
z
(∏
k∈T
(1− ρkαn)
)
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ]) log2
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ])
Qαn(z)
+O (αn) (263)
(c)
=
∑
z
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ]) log2
Qαn(z)
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ])
+O (αn) , (264)
where (a) follows from splitting the term on the right hand side of (261) into two based on whether
x [T ] = x∅ [T ] or not, (b) follows from the fact that at least one of the symbols in x [T ] in the second
term in (262) is the symbol 1, and (c) follows from the expansion of the product term. From the definition
of Qαn , we obtain
Qαn(z) =
∑
x[T ]
WZ|X[T ](z|x [T ])
(∏
k∈T
ΠXk(xk)
)
(265)
=
∑
x[T ] 6=x∅[T ]
WZ|X[T ](z|x [T ])
(∏
k∈T
ΠXk(xk)
)
+WZ|X[T ](z|x∅ [T ])
(∏
k∈T
(1− ρkαn)
)
(266)
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= WZ|X[T ](z|x∅ [T ]) +O (αn) . (267)
Combining (264) and (267), we obtain
E
(
log2
WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])
Qαn(Z)
)
=
∑
z
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ]) log2
(
1 +
O (αn)
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ])
)
+O (αn) (268)
(a)
= O (αn) , (269)
where (a) follows from the application of the Taylor series of the log term. Using the definition of ηT
in (241), for an arbitrary µ > 0, we upper bound (258) by
P
(Bnη c) 6 ∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
P
(
log
W ⊗nZ|X[T ] (Z|X[T ])
Q⊗nαn (Z)
> ηT
)
(270)
=
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
P
(
n∑
i=1
log
WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])
Qαn(Z)
> (1 + µ)nI(X[T ];Z)
)
(271)
=
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
P
(
n∑
i=1
VT > µnI(X[T ];Z)
)
(272)
(a)
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
exp
(
−
1
2 (µnI(X[T ];Z))2
nO (αn) + 13cµnI(X[T ];Z)
)
(273)
(b)
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
exp (−c1nαn) (274)
6 exp (−c2nαn) , (275)
for appropriate constants c, c1, c2 > 0, where (a) follows from using Bernstein’s inequality, and (b) follows
from the fact that I (X[T ];Z) = ∑k∈T ρkαnD(Qk‖Q∅) +O (α2n), for any non-empty set T ⊆ K, from
Lemma 1. Combining (257) and (275), for an appropriate constant c3 > 0, we obtain
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6
∑
T ⊆K:
T 6=∅
eηT(∏
k∈T MkLk
) + exp (−c3nαn) . (276)
Using the definition of ηT , we conclude from (276) that for an arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1) and a large n, if∑
k∈T
log(MkLk) = (1 + δ) (1 + µ)nαn
∑
k∈T
ρkD(Qk‖Q∅), (277)
for every non-empty set T ⊆ K, then there exists a constant ξ > 0, such that
E
(
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
))
6 exp (−ξnαn) . (278)
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If T is a singleton set {k}, where k ∈ K, it follows from (277) that
log(MkLk) = (1 + δ) (1 + µ) ρknαnD(Qk‖Q∅). (279)
Observing (277) and (279), we conclude that (277) is automatically satisfied for every non-empty set
T ⊆ K, if logMkLk satisfies (279) for every k ∈ K.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Since D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
6 exp (−ξ2nαn), it follows from Pinsker’s inequality that V
(
Q̂n, Q⊗nαn
)
6 exp
(−12ξ2nαn).
Furthermore, we write
D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
= D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
+
∑
z
Q̂n(z) log
(
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n∅ (z)
)
(280)
= D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn
)
+ D
(
Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n∅
)
+
∑
z
(
Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)
)
log
(
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n∅ (z)
)
. (281)
Rearranging the terms in (281) and taking the absolute value yields∣∣∣D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅ )− D(Q⊗nαn‖Q⊗n∅ )∣∣∣ 6 D(Q̂n‖Q⊗nαn)+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
z
(
Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)
)
log
(
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n∅ (z)
)∣∣∣∣∣ . (282)
Defining νmin , minz Q∅(z), we bound the second term on the right hand side of (282) for n large
enough as follows.∣∣∣∣∣∑
z
(
Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)
)
log
(
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n∅ (z)
)∣∣∣∣∣
6
∑
z
∣∣∣Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣log
(
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n∅ (z)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (283)
=
∑
z
∣∣∣Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)∣∣∣
(
log
(
Q⊗nαn(z)
Q⊗n∅ (z)
)
1
{
Q⊗nαn(z)>Q
⊗n
∅ (z)
}
+log
(
Q⊗n∅ (z)
Q⊗nαn(z)
)
1
{
Q⊗nαn(z)<Q
⊗n
∅ (z)
})
(284)
(a)
6
∑
z
∣∣∣Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)∣∣∣
(
n log
1
νmin
1
{
Q⊗nαn(z) > Q
⊗n
∅ (z)
}
+
n∑
i=1
log
Q∅(zi)(∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn)
)
Q∅(zi)
1
{
Q⊗nαn(z) < Q
⊗n
∅ (z)
})
(285)
6
∑
z
∣∣∣Q̂n(z)−Q⊗nαn(z)∣∣∣ (n log 1νmin + n log 1∏k∈K (1− ρkαn)
)
(286)
= 2V
(
Q̂n, Q⊗nαn
)(
n log
1(∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn)
)
νmin
)
(287)
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6 2 exp
(
−1
2
ξ2nαn
)(
n log
1(∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn)
)
νmin
)
, (288)
where (a) follows from the fact that Qαn(z) >
∏
k∈K (1− ρkαn)Q∅(z).
APPENDIX G
EXTENSION TO NON-BINARY INPUT ALPHABETS
To be more specific, each user is now characterized by a distinct input alphabet Xk , J0, NkK with
one innocent symbol 0 and Nk information symbols. The input distributions defined in the manuscript
need to be suitably modified as follows.
∀k, ΠXk(0) = 1− ρkαn, and for i ∈ J1, NkK, ΠXk(i) = ρkβk,iαn, (289)
where
∑
i∈J1,NkK βk,i = 1. We need to introduce a new notation to describe the distributions induced by
a fixed choice of input.
∀x ∈
K×
i=1
Xi Qx(z) = WZ|X[K](z|x). (290)
As done before, for a given vector x, the vector x[T ] is the subvector of size |T | comprised of the
components of x with index in T . In addition xT = (xT ,1, . . . , xT ,K) is a K length vector which
contains the symbol 0 in positions indexed by T c. For T ⊆ K, we define the distributions
QT (z) ,
∑
xT
(∏
k∈T
βk,xT ,k
)
QxT (z), (291)
and
Qαn(z) ,
∑
x[K]
WZ|X[K](z|x[K])
(∏
k∈K
ΠXk(xk)
)
. (292)
In the special case that T is a singleton, say {k}, we simply write Qk in place of QT , and if the
unique non-zero symbol in xT is i ∈ J1, NkK, we write Qk,i in place of QxT . With this convention, note
that we have
Qk(z) =
∑
i∈J1,NkKβk,iQk,i(z). (293)
For ρ ∈ [0, 1]K and β ∈ [0, 1]K , we finally introduce
χ(ρ,β) =
∑
z
(∑
k∈K ρk (Qk(z)−Q∅(z))
)2
Q∅(z)
=
∑
z
(∑
k∈K ρk
(∑
i∈J1,NkK βk,iQk,i(z)−Q∅(z)
))2
Q∅(z)
.
(294)
Similar notation holds when focusing on the main channel instead of the warden channel, in which
case we write P instead of Q.
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With this notation, one can check that Lemma 1 may be extended to obtain
α2n
2
(1 +
√
αn)χn(ρ,β) > D(Qαn‖Q∅) >
α2n
2
(1−√αn)χn(ρ,β), (295)
and
I(X[T ];Z) = αn
∑
k∈T
ρk
Nk∑
i=1
βk,iD(Qk,i‖Q∅) +O
(
α2n
)
. (296)
Notice that while χ(ρ) only depends on the distributions {Qk}k∈K, the expansion of the mutual infor-
mation involves distributions {Qk,i}, which effectively forces us to keep track of the {βk,i}.
It is then not too painful to check that the covert capacity region contains the region defined by⋃
{ρk}k∈K∈[0,1]K :∑k∈K ρk=1
{βk,i}k∈J1,KK,i∈J1,NkK:∀k{βk,i}Nki=1∈[0,1]Nk ,∑Nki=1 βk,i=1
{
{rk}k∈K : ∀k ∈ K, rk 6
√
2
χ (ρ,β)
ρk
Nk∑
i=1
βk,iD(Pk,i‖P∅)
}
.
(297)
For the converse part, one can define
1− µ(n)kj , ΠXkj (0) ,
∑Mk
mk=1
∑Lk
`k=1
1{Xkj(mk, `k) = 0}
MkLk
, (298)
and for i ∈ J1, NkK
ΠXkj (i) , µ
(n)
kj β
(n)
k,i,j . (299)
in which case the steps leading to the lower bound of the KL divergence are identical thanks to our
redefinition of QT and Qk done earlier. The steps leading to the upper bound of the mutual information
require slightly more care because (88) in the manuscript must be replaced by
∑
T ⊆K
∑
xT
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
D(PxT ‖P∅)
−
∑
y
∑
T ⊆K
∑
xT
(∏
i∈K
ΠXij (xT ,i)
)
PxT (y) log
WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xT [K \ {k}])
P∅(y)
, (300)
to account for multiple information symbols. Checking how this affects the remaining calculations requires
additional care, but one can check that we obtain a modified version of (102) in the manuscript of the
form
I(Xkj ;Yj |Xj [K\{k}]) 6 µ(n)kj
Nk∑
`=1
β
(n)
i,`,jD(Pk,`‖P∅) + d4µ(n)max
∑
i∈K
µ
(n)
ij
Ni∑
`=1
β
(n)
i,`,j . (301)
Following the exact same steps in the manuscript, one obtains the converse matching the achievability
region highlighted earlier. The analysis of the least achievable key rates on the boundary follows similarly.
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While we could include all the considerations outlined above in the manuscript, we feel that they do
not really add much to the paper, and require the introduction of another complex layer of notation.
We would welcome the reviewer’s opinion on this matter, but we propose for now to add the following
simpler statement in the conclusion.
APPENDIX H
EXTENSION TO AWGN CHANNELS
If covertness were to be measured with variational distance and if one were to use on-off-keying, one
could follow the approach outlined in [32] and handle the covert constraint as done in our achievability
proof. However, since our results focus on KL divergence to measure covertness, an achievability proof
must accommodate the continuous nature of the AWGN channel alphabet and possibly the need to
use input distributions that are not discrete (see [5]). One solution is to use a resolvability exponent
approach [39], [40], [41] instead of the typical-sequence approach used in the manuscript to obtain
bounds for the KL divergence D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n∅
)
that do not depend on the alphabet cardinality. One technical
aspect of this approach is that one must perform a careful Taylor series of the resolvability exponent.
As for the converse part, one can follow the steps used in [5] with the necessary adaptations to handle
multiple users. More specifically, Following the single-letterization approach of [5], we obtain
D
(
Qˆn‖Q⊗n0
)
>
n∑
j=1
D
(
Qˆj‖Q0
)
(302)
=
n∑
j=1
(
−h(Qˆnj ) +
1
2
log 2piσ2 + EQˆj
(
Z2
2σ2
))
(303)
Because Zj and the channel inputs {Xi,j} are independent (by definition), we have
Var(Z) = σ2 +
∑
i∈K
Var(Xi,j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,θi,j
. (304)
Since a Gaussian distribution maximizes the differential entropy among all variables with the same
variance and since the variance is a lower bound on the second order moment, we obtain
D
(
Qˆj‖Q0
)
> −1
2
log(2pie(σ2 +
∑
i∈K
θi,j)) +
1
2
log 2piσ2 +
σ2 +
∑
i∈K θi,j
2σ2
(305)
=
∑
i∈K θi,j
2σ2
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
i∈K θi,j
σ2
)
. (306)
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Since we can argue as done in the manuscript that every
∑
i∈K θi,j should vanish, we obtain
D
(
Qˆn‖Q⊗n0
)
>
n∑
j=1
(
(
∑
i∈K θi,j)
2
4σ4
+ o
(
(
∑
i∈K
θi,j)
2
))
(307)
> 1
n
(∑i∈K∑nj=1 θi,j)2
4σ4
+ o
(∑
i∈K
n∑
j=1
θi,j)
2
 . (308)
Note that the last step should be argued a bit more carefully but is nevertheless correct. Similarly, we
can upper bound logMk as
logMk 6
1
1− n
 n∑
j=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
θk,j
σ2
)
+Hb(n)
 (309)
6 1
1− n
 n∑
j=1
θk,j
2σ2
+Hb(n)
 (310)
Putting everything together, one would then obtain
logMk√
nD
(
Qˆj‖Q0
) 6
∑n
j=1
θk,j
2σ2 +Hb(n)
(1− n)
√
(
∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 θi,j)
2
4σ4 + o
(
(
∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 θi,j)
2
) (311)
=
1
(1− n)
√
1 + o(1))
( ∑n
i=1 θk,i∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 θi,j
+
Hb(n)∑
i∈K
∑n
j=1 θi,j
)
(312)
Reproducing the reasoning in the manuscript to deal with all the terms properly, we would then obtain
that the covert capacity must be contained in the region described by⋃
{ρk}k∈K:∑k ρk=1
{{rk}k∈K : rk 6 ρk} . (313)
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